Greek Texts & Translations

44.57Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them. ^note If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one. 44.58But, if it is possible without an affidavit of objections to obtain a hearing before all tribunals, is not the use of one a mark of recklessness and utter desperation? For the lawgiver did not make it obligatory on the contending parties, but granted them the privilege of putting in such an affidavit, if they chose, as though he were testing the character of each one of us, to see how we stand with reference to a reckless procedure. ^note 44.59Further, if it rested with those who file these affidavits, there would be neither courts of justice nor trials; for the nature of affidavits of objections is to bIock all these things and to prevent all cases from being brought into the court-room—at least so far as the will of the one swearing the affidavit goes. Therefore I think we should regard such people as the common enemies of all men, and that they should never receive any indulgence when they are on trial before you; for each one of them comes into court, not under compulsion, but having chosen to incur the risk of the oath.

44.60Well then, that the affidavit is false, you have learned pretty definitely from the statements contained in it and from the arguments which you have heard. But that the laws also give us this inheritance as our right, men of the jury, I wish to prove in a few words—not as though this had not been made clear to you in what I said at the outset, but that you may the better bear in mind the justice of our case, and so meet the false statements of our opponents.

44.61To sum up the matter briefly, we, since we are the nearest of kin in the male line to Archiades, to whom this estate belonged, and since of the persons whom he adopted some have gone back to the family of their fathers, and the one last left had died without issue,—in these circumstances, we, I say, claim to inherit. 44.62We are not depriving Leostratus of any property ( for these men hold what is their own) , but we claim the estate left by Archiades, which is ours according to the laws. For the law, men of the jury, ordains that males and the sons of males should have precedence; and such we are. Archiades had no children, and we are the ones nearest of kin to him. 44.63Further, it is surely not just that an adopted son should bring other sons into a family by adoption; he may leave in it children born to him, but in default of these he must restore the inheritance to those related by blood. That is what the laws ordain.

For is it not plain that each one of you is excluded from the right of inheritance by direct descent, if this licence be granted to children by adoption? For you see that most people who adopt children do so through being cajoled by flattery and often in a spirit of contentiousness caused by family quarrels. But if an adopted son is to be permitted in defiance of the law to adopt whomsoever he pleases, inheritances will never be given to blood-relations. 44.64It was to guard against this that the lawgiver forbade a person who was himself adopted to create a son by adoption. In what manner did he declare his view regarding this? When he says “ a man may return to his own family, leaving behind him a lawfully born son” he makes it plain, I take it, that it is not lawful for him to adopt; for it is impossible for a man to leave behind him a lawfully born son, unless he have a son born of his body. But you, Leostratus, claim the right to bring an adopted son into the inheritance of the dead man, who had himself been adopted into our family, just as though you were taking possession of your own property, and not that which the law declares shall be given to the nearest of kin.

44.65For ourselves, men of the jury, if the deceased had adopted anyone, even though the law does not allow it, we should have submitted; or, if he had left a will, we should also have been ready to abide by that; for from the beginning this has been our position; we made no objection to their holding the property and returning to their original family in whatever manner they pleased. 44.66Now, however, that the affair has at length been exposed both by these men themselves and by the laws, we hold that it is right for us to inherit the estate of Archiades, and that the son to be adopted should come from us who have not been adopted before, and not from them. For it was just, in my opinion, that the lawgiver, as he laid upon the nearest of kin the duty of relieving the misfortunes of their relatives, and of giving in marriage their women-folk, so also has given to these same people as their due the right of inheriting and of sharing in the good things.